The Virus Does Not Need a Visa

There is a particular kind of complacency that sets in when a disaster is happening somewhere else. We watch it on the news, we feel something, and then we move on. However, we simply cannot afford to look away from the Ebola outbreak, which appears to be gathering momentum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In May 2026, an Ebola epidemic was confirmed in the Ituri Province of that Central African country. It is the 17th recorded Ebola outbreak in the DRC since the virus was first identified in 1976, and it came only five months after the previous outbreak ended. The strain responsible is the Bundibugyo ebolavirus. It is rarer than the Zaire strain most people associate with the disease and, in some ways, more complicated to fight. As of 31 May, the DRC Ministry of Health reported 282 confirmed cases and 42 confirmed deaths, with a further 220 suspected cases still under investigation. Uganda had confirmed nine cases and one death; at least three of them were linked to travel from the DRC. The numbers are increasing, and experts are emphatic that official figures in the middle of an active outbreak almost always undercount reality. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has not in any way tried to underplay what is happening. Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus called the situation a “catastrophic collision of disease and conflict”. He has warned that attacks on health facilities, insecurity, and mass displacement were making it “nearly impossible” to trace contacts and isolate cases. Contact tracing is at the core of Ebola containment. When it breaks down, the virus finds space to move and move fast. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) has placed Nigeria formally on high alert. It is a warning that the risk of importing the Ebola virus is elevated due to heightened regional transmission, international travel and cross-border population movement. The agency classified Lagos, the FCT, Rivers, Kano, Enugu, Borno, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Taraba, and Adamawa as high-risk states. This is because of their international airports, porous borders, and active trade or travel routes. Undoubtedly, these are where most Nigerians live, work, buy, sell, and move through every day. The risk is not theoretical, and the geography makes that clear. Now, there is one detail about this specific outbreak that Nigerian health authorities have been upfront about. The Bundibugyo Ebola virus disease currently has no approved vaccine or specific treatment, making early public health intervention the only effective defence. Existing Ebola vaccines target the Zaire strain and cannot be relied upon for the present outbreak. What we have is behaviour, information, and speed of detection. All three depend heavily on what ordinary or average Nigerians choose to do under the current circumstances. The truth is that Ebola is not a disease that requires mystery to spread. It is not airborne and spreads mainly through direct contact with infected blood, body fluids, contaminated surfaces, or infected animals. You cannot catch it by sitting near someone on a bus. It enters through broken skin or mucous membranes, and it requires close physical contact with a sick or deceased person. This is why burials are a route: the bereaved usually embrace the bodies of their loved ones without knowing the risk they are toying with. The NCDC has also flagged a specific diagnostic danger: early Ebola symptoms closely resemble those of malaria and Lassa fever, both of which are endemic in Nigeria. This scenario makes delayed recognition a serious concern. A returned traveller who develops fever, fatigue, and body pain may reach for their usual antimalarials and assume the worst has passed. That assumption, in the wrong circumstances, could cost lives. This often starts with their own and, potentially, extends to the family members or healthcare workers around them. Anyone who has been in the DRC, Uganda or surrounding areas in the past three weeks and falls ill, therefore, needs to telephone a healthcare facility before walking in. That call serves as the first line of protection. Now, Nigeria has been precisely at this point before, and the world watched what we did. On 20 July 2014, Patrick Sawyer, a Liberian-American, escaped quarantine in Liberia and flew to Lagos to attend a meeting of the Economic Community of West African States. He collapsed at the airport and was taken to First Consultants Medical Centre in Lagos. Dr Ameyo Stella Adadevoh was the lead consultant physician and endocrinologist at that hospital, where she had worked for over 20 years. She diagnosed Sawyer as Nigeria’s first Ebola case. She then refused to discharge him. This decision carried enormous personal and professional risk. When threatened by officials who wanted Sawyer released to attend a conference, she stood her ground, saying she would not let him go “for the greater public good”. Dr Adadevoh and three of her colleagues who contracted the virus died, paying the ultimate price for that decision. What followed was a response that contained the outbreak to 20 cases and 8 deaths. The WHO described Nigeria’s successful containment as a “spectacular story worth telling”. However, it was also a story told at enormous cost to the people who made it possible, and it should not breed complacency. Today, the structures that worked in 2014 are being reactivated. The National Emergency Operations Centre has been placed on alert mode, and rapid response teams are on standby for immediate deployment to any state where a suspected case emerges. Ebola infection prevention and control checklists are being distributed to hospitals nationwide. Healthcare workers are undergoing refresher training on triage, case identification, and protective protocols. The government’s side of this is being activated. The question is whether the public is up to speed. Now, a few things need to be emphasised. If you work in healthcare, the protective equipment is not optional when there is an active regional Ebola threat. The moment you begin triaging which patients “look risky enough” to warrant full precautions is the moment the protection fails. Ebola has a way of looking like something else, and that is precisely what the NCDC has warned us about. Use the protocols uniformly. The inconvenience of doing so correctly is immeasurable compared to what happens when a single breach goes undetected. For everyone else, the obligations are less dramatic but no less real. Always wash your hands with soap and water. Monitor your health for 21 days after travelling from affected areas. Be honest with doctors about where you have been. And do not share unverified health information on social media. During the 2014 outbreak, rumours spread faster than the virus itself, and the consequences were quite significant. False cures circulated. People avoided hospitals out of fear. Misinformation during a disease outbreak is not just irresponsible; it actively deepens the harm. It is easy to watch what is happening in the DRC and assume the distance will protect us. Unfortunately, distance will not serve as a barrier to the disease. Our airports, trade routes, and borders are enough evidence of that. What will protect us is the same combination that worked about 12 years ago: a competent public health system and citizens who take personal responsibility seriously enough to act on what they know. We must ensure we have these. Ojenagbon, a health communication expert, lives in Lagos.