False nines? 4-4-2? The tactical trends defining World Cup so far

Football tactics are continually being developed and analysed in an increasingly detailed manner so it is interesting, and fun, to see the 4-4-2 become so commonly used at this World Cup.

Premier League football of the early 2000s was typified by the 4-4-2 formation. Spaces between players were bigger with fewer low blocks and less drilled high presses seen.

This led to more time and space for attackers to express themselves.

Teams, perhaps due to conditions and lack of coaching time, have reverted to using a 4-4-2 that looks similar, in part explaining why games feel more open.

Many teams are opting for such a shape out of possession including Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Brazil, Haiti, Scotland and Japan, at times.

In their 4-4-2, teams are picking moments in which to step up and press but for large parts of the game are choosing instead to defend in a mid-block – rather than defending deep or pressing high consistently.

If international sides opt to simply sit in and defend deep, they are ultimately conceding a level of control on the game.

Especially against bigger nations, allowing them long spells of attacking possession around your box essentially gives them the sort of game they would want to play.

Pressing intensely all game becomes less effective given the gruelling heat and humidity but in moments has provided fruitful for teams such as Mexico, Morocco and Germany, who have all scored soon after forcing an opposition turnover.

This then leaves teams defending in the middle of the pitch in a 4-4-2 shape.

The formation provides cover in a wide and balanced manner but it does leave spaces between the lines that teams have managed to exploit well via our next trend.

A trend we saw for the most successful club sides this season was the use of roaming strikers. Harry Kane and Ousmane Dembele helped Bayern Munich and Paris St-Germain get much joy in possession by leaving natural striker positions.

On the international stage, Spain have historically found joy using midfielders as false nines rather than traditional strikers.

By flooding their team with technical midfielders, teams struggled to get the ball off them.

With teams increasingly adopting man-to-man marking as a defensive approach at club level and in the World Cup, allowing a striker to move into unusually deep and wide positions poses a difficult dilemma for the defensive team.

If centre-backs follow them into deep midfield or to the wing, space opens up in the middle of their defence.

If centre-backs leave them, uncomfortable to be pulled too far away from their back line, the technical strikers give their side an overload in an area of the pitch - helping their side keep the ball and create dangerous attacks.

Saibari of Morocco, Kai Havertz of Germany, and Raul Jimenez of Mexico all did this to a certain extent. Kane and Dembele are likely to do similar jobs for the nation as they did so effectively at club level.

USA's win against Paraguay has arguably been the best display of attacking football at the tournament so far.

This was in part aided by Paraguay's poor defensive approach but Mauricio Pochettino's men provided the best example of how nations are opting to use more fluid midfields.

USA in possession played a back three, with Antonee Robinson wide on the left and Sergino Dest wide on the right. Folarin Balogun played up top.

These roles were fairly fixed but the four remaining players – Tyler Adams, Malik Tillman, Christian Pulisic, and Weston McKennie moved more freely in the central areas, encouraged to play closer to each other.

We are all familiar with the 3-box-3 shape many clubs sides use in possession but instead of maintaining the midfield box in a rigid manner, the attacking midfielder from the far side would come towards the ball.

With the Paraguay midfielders unsure if they should follow, USA often found themselves with overloads in midfield.

The many players in close proximity drew in opposition players and when this happened, USA looked to play direct passers for runners in-behind where fewer defenders were.

It is exactly what South Korea did against Bosnia too. With a fluid midfield box, they often dropped deep with many players around the ball, drew pressure before releasing attackers higher up the pitch.