Trump makes peace with Iran's regime and the men Israel once set out to kill

When Iran and the United States inked a deal on the war this week, one unlikely figure on the Iranian side emerged from the shadows of the negotiations and into the open.

Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, a former commander of Iran's powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who now serves as parliamentary speaker, has been an outspoken critic of the US and Israel during their conflict with Iran.

He's mocked US administration officials, claimed Tehran's enemies will not achieve their goals — and declared the June 14 deal, per the semiofficial Fars news agency, "a record of America's failure".

And yet the "authoritarian technocrat", who is described by analysts as "pragmatic, managerial and opportunistic", has also been one of the chief negotiators for the Iranian side as it worked with the US and mediators to find a way to end more than 100 days of war.

For months, Donald Trump has spoken of a "new group of leaders" in Iran who were seeking to make a deal with the United States, but not much was known about who they were and what they wanted.

"They have a new group of leaders and actually I think they're smarter," the US president said again this week.

"I think they're very smart. I think they are far less radicalised."

It appears Mr Qalibaf was one of the men Mr Trump was referring to in his strange praise of the regime.

The parliamentary speaker's status as a top negotiator is all the more striking given that up until a few months ago he was on a "kill list" as Israel systematically struck key officials and commanders in Tehran.

"The Israelis had their coordinates and wanted to take them [Qalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi] out, we told the US if they are also eliminated then there is no-one else to talk to, hence the US asked the Israelis to back off," a Pakistani source with knowledge of the discussions told news agency Reuters in March.

But analysts have told the ABC that while the speaker is a figure the US can negotiate with, he has deep ties to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, the broader Iranian regime and its security apparatus.

"Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf is one of the most significant regime figures left standing after the war," said Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King's College London.

And Dr Krieg said Mr Qalibaf's transformation from Israeli "target" to deal signatory has only strengthened his stature as "a regime stabiliser".

Now, the "wannabe strongman" in Tehran will be among a core group looking to sell the "ceasefire" as a victory for Iran and a humiliation for its enemies.

'Authoritarian technocrat' with deep links to the IRGC

The son of a shopkeeper, Mr Qalibaf was 18 years old when revolution gripped Iran, transforming the fates of millions of people.

He joined the Basij militia, one of the branches of the IRGC, not long afterwards and fought in the country's bloody war with Iraq.

Mr Qalibaf rose quickly through the organisation's wartime command structure to become one of its youngest commanders.

Along the way, he reportedly developed deep ties with Khamenei and other future leaders of the revolutionary guards, connections that later served him well on his climb to the top of Iran's political ladder.

After serving in several key positions following the Iran-Iraq war, including as head of the IRGC air force, Mr Qalibaf was appointed by Khamenei as the national police chief in 2000.

His selection arrived not long after a tense moment in Iran's regime as student protests broke out across Tehran.

What had begun as demonstrations in response to the government's closure of a ground-breaking reformist newspaper, Salaam, and the parliament's approval of a regressive new media law, quickly grew into the most dramatic anti-regime upheaval in many years.

When protests broke out again in 2003, Mr Qalibaf ordered the arrest of countless journalists, authors, and activists and reportedly directed authorities to use live gunfire against students.

"It is absolutely fair to describe him as closely associated with the IRGC," Dr Krieg said. "But he is not best understood as a purely ideological IRGC hardliner.

"He is more of a praetorian technocrat: authoritarian, deeply embedded in the security state, but also pragmatic, managerial and opportunistic."

Having made a name for himself within the regime, Mr Qalibaf eyed his next role: the presidency.

The rise of a 'strongman'

In Iran, ultimate authority rests with the supreme leader, but the elected president is still the head of the government.

And Mr Qalibaf, who had cut a path to power by crushing dissent in the country, wanted the top job.

"Qalibaf is Iran's wannabe strongman," Sina Azodi, director of Middle East studies at George Washington University, told the Washington Post in March.

"A hardliner with a pragmatic streak."

Starting in 2005, he has unsuccessfully run for the presidency four times. But that hasn't stopped Mr Qalibaf from trying to craft an image of himself as a bold leader.

During the 12-day war with Israel in June last year, he reportedly moved around Tehran by motorcycle to evade detection.

And in the most recent conflict, he has been outspoken on social media, taunting Iran's enemies in frequent posts.

Dr Krieg said Mr Qalibaf's lengthy career, in which he also served as mayor of Tehran for 12 years, gave him a "rare combination of political, security, technocratic and economic networks".

"His power comes from being acceptable to several constituencies at once," he said.

IRGC veterans, parts of Iran's conservative political class and now the supreme leader's office under Mojtaba Khamenei were among them.

It is perhaps for this reason that he became a target of Israel during the war.

"It captures the paradox of this war: Israel treated [him] as [a] strategic node in the regime, while the United States now treats [him] as [an] indispensable interlocutor," Dr Krieg said.

Mr Qalibaf's status as a former Israeli target is now "useful propaganda" for Tehran, he explained, because the regime can say America has to negotiate with someone Israeli wanted dead.

"For Israel, it is more uncomfortable. It suggests that military pressure did not eliminate the regime's decision-making core; it may even have elevated the surviving figures who can now claim wartime authority," he added.

While President Masoud Pezeshkian still remains head of government, Dr Krieg said it is Mr Qalibaf who now carries greater institutional weight on strategic questions.

"He is useful because he can translate a security-state decision into a political one. That is exactly why his presence in the US-Iran track matters."

Behind the deal-making frenzy

Since announcing a shaky ceasefire in April, the United States and Iran have been working towards a more formal agreement to end the war.

Mr Trump repeatedly claimed in the last few weeks that a "peace deal" was near, before escalating his rhetoric and threatening to attack Tehran and then, just as quickly, backing away from the threats.

Part of the uncertainty over whether an agreement would one day take place reportedly came down to US intelligence officials' scepticism of Iran's willingness to make meaningful concessions to get an agreement.

"Politically, the Iranian regime has been really hollowed out by, in particular, the assassinations that took place of the top strata of Iranian political leadership in the first weeks of the war," said Jessica Genauer, a conflict expert with University of New South Wales.

"So the Iranian regime that is coming out of this war has survived but is a much more brittle regime. And it's a regime where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have even more control."

Ultimately, in the race to get a deal signed before Mr Trump's 80th birthday, Mr Khamenei was said to be the one to give final sign off on the memorandum of understanding (MOU).

Four Iranian officials told the New York Times the supreme leader directed Mr Qalibaf over the weekend to put the text of the agreement to a vote at the 13-member Supreme National Security Council and, if a three-fourths majority was reached, to proceed with signing.

Gathering in a secret location, the council approved the deal, though at least two hard-line members voted against it, the newspaper reported.

Mr Qalibaf's role in getting final sign off came after he served as Iran's chief negotiator in talks with the US in Pakistan in April.

While those discussions ultimately failed, the Americans left with a favourable view of him.

Mr Qalibaf "impressed the American team as a refined and professional bargainer — and potential leader of a new Iran", the Washington Post reported.

Yet Mr Qalibaf has publicly said he was "reluctant" to take on the role.

"Before accepting responsibility for the negotiations, I did everything I could to avoid being assigned this task," he said in an interview with Iran's Press TV on Wednesday night.

He said his unwillingness to accept the position was partly because Mr Trump was the "overseer of the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani", a close friend of his who was killed by a US air strike in Iraq in 2020.

"When I saw that none of the officials proposed anyone else, and that my own suggestions were not accepted, I had to carry out what had become my duty," he said of the decision to take part in the dealmaking.

Dr Krieg has cautioned against overplaying Mr Qalibaf's role, arguing others key figures have also been involved in the arduous process.

He said Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, a career diplomat and former JCPOA negotiator who is "fluent in the language of Western diplomacy, but … not an independent liberal reformist", has also been a significant figure.

"[Araghchi] is regime-loyal, experienced and pragmatic. His role is to make the deal technically negotiable and internationally defensible," Dr Krieg said.

"In the Iranian system, however, foreign ministers do not set grand strategy alone. They operate within parameters set by the supreme leader, the SNSC, the IRGC and the wider security establishment."

He said Araghchi matters because he can "execute a deal", while Qalibaf matters because "he can legitimise it inside the power structure".

"Araghchi did the classic foreign-ministry work: shuttle diplomacy, managing the Oman track, dealing with Pakistan, Russia and China, and keeping the negotiation internationally viable," Dr Krieg said.

He says Qalibaf gives the deal "domestic political armour".

"It means Tehran wanted the deal anchored in someone with IRGC credibility, parliamentary authority and proximity to the new supreme leader's office," he said.

How Iran plans to sell the US agreement

In the end, Iran agreed to a deal because the war has become too expensive and too dangerous, analysts say.

Under attack from the US and Israel for months, the regime took a massive economic and military battering.

Infrastructure within Iran has been severely destroyed, military assets have been degraded and the economy decimated.

"The Iranian regime needed a deal just as much as the US seems to have wanted a deal," Dr Genauer said.

Dr Krieg explained that while Iran needed sanctions relief before the war, the conflict has now made the problem "existential".

"Disrupted oil flows, damage to infrastructure, inflationary pressure, blocked or constrained Strait of Hormuz traffic, fiscal stress, public exhaustion and the risk of renewed unrest [have all had an impact]," Dr Krieg said.

"The regime does not need a beautiful peace; it needs breathing space."

Despite Tehran's brittle condition, analysts are framing the deal the regime managed to sign with the US as a win for Iran.

Under the terms of the agreement, which were made public by the White House on Wednesday, the Strait of Hormuz will reopen, oil exports will resume under waivers, sanctions relief for Iran is set to begin, and reconstruction finance for the regime may become possible.

"Tehran appears to get immediate practical relief while deferring the most difficult concessions," Dr Krieg said.

The deal also gives Tehran the opportunity to push the message that it endured US-Israeli military pressure and forced Washington back into negotiations.

"That narrative matters domestically because the Islamic Republic cannot admit that it was rescued by compromise; it must present compromise as resistance by other means," Dr Krieg said.

Meanwhile, Qalibaf and the pragmatic-security camp he is aligned with will likely be strengthen by the deal, analysts say.

"It would not solve the regime's legitimacy crisis, but it would buy time," Dr Krieg said.

"It would also give Mojtaba Khamenei's leadership a chance to consolidate after a brutal transition period. But the risks are real.

"If economic relief does not arrive quickly, the deal will look hollow. [And] if the United States or Israel re-escalates, hardliners will say they were right."