Electoral wrongs can be corrected before it’s too late

An erroneous rejection of nomination affects not merely the rights of a candidate but the structure of the election.

4 min readJun 22, 2026 06:34 AM IST

First published on: Jun 22, 2026 at 06:34 AM IST

The controversy over the rejection of a nomination paper in the recent Rajya Sabha election from Madhya Pradesh raises an important constitutional question: How should the legal system respond when a returning officer (RO) is alleged to have unlawfully excluded a candidate from an election, yet the constitutional commitment to uninterrupted elections restricts judicial intervention until the electoral process is over?

The issue highlights a tension in election law. The Constitution seeks to ensure that elections proceed without disruption and are conducted in accordance with law. These objectives are complementary in theory but can occasionally come into conflict. The conventional constitutional response is found in Article 329(b), which generally bars judicial interference in electoral matters once the election process has begun. It channels disputes into an election petition after the declaration of results. This principle, upheld by the Supreme Court, serves an important democratic purpose. Elections cannot be subjected to litigation at every intermediate stage. Yet Article 329 was never intended to create a zone of immunity for electoral illegality.

An erroneous rejection of nomination affects not merely the rights of a candidate but the structure of the election. After polling, the consequences of such exclusion may become difficult to remedy in a meaningful way. The question is whether the constitutional framework provides a corrective mechanism.

The answer may lie in a fuller understanding of Article 324 — it vests in the Election Commission of India the “superintendence, direction and control” of elections. Judicial decisions have recognised that Article 324’s supervisory authority enables the ECI to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. Although ROs exercise statutory powers under the Representation of the People Act, they do so under the ECI’s constitutional control. If the body has the authority to supervise electoral conduct, ensure compliance with election law and even countermand elections in exceptional circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that it lacks the power to correct a legal error by an RO in the scrutiny of nominations.

Such oversight need not assume the character of conventional appellate jurisdiction. Every dissatisfied candidate cannot be permitted to seek the reconsideration of routine factual determinations. However, a limited revisional jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional errors, manifest illegality, or clear misinterpretation of statutory provisions would enable serious legal disputes to be resolved promptly before polling and, more importantly, harmonise Articles 324 and 329.

The SC’s cautious approach was justified. However, constitutional adjudication must remain attentive to the efficacy of remedies. Election petitions are often decided after substantial delays. By the time a final judgment is rendered, elected representatives may have served a significant part of their term. Political alignments may have shifted. Members of the electoral college may have resigned, died or become disqualified. A successful petition may establish a legal wrong but offer little practical means of correcting it.

That’s why Article 142 is relevant — it empowers the SC to pass such orders as may be necessary for doing complete justice in a matter before it. It is not a licence to disregard constitutional limitations, nor can it routinely displace statutory remedies. It exists for exceptional situations. Where a candidate alleges exclusion on a ground that is ex-facie contrary to law, where the ECI has not exercised corrective supervision under Article 324, and where postponing scrutiny until an election petition may render effective relief impossible, a carefully tailored exercise of Article 142 may be constitutionally defensible. This would not amount to repudiating Article 329, but an attempt to reconcile the constitutional commitment to electoral continuity with the equally important commitment to meaningful justice.

The controversy reveals a structural gap. The challenge is not to choose between the three articles, but to harmonise them.

The writer retired as a senior IAS officer. Views are personal