How Trump can win back allies and rejuvenate US diplomacy on Iran

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When Secretary of State Marco Rubio touched down in Abu Dhabi on June 23 for his first visit to the Gulf since the Iran war began, he offered a telling description of his purpose. “We want to make sure their views are taken into account in every decision that we make,” he told reporters.

It was a welcome sentiment — albeit long overdue. Collectively, the Gulf states took the brunt of Iranian missiles and drones fired during the war. Critical energy, transportation and tourism sites were struck. Their economies suffered massive disruption from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Through it all, the administration that now claims it wants to ensure their interests are protected couldn’t be bothered to send any of its top officers to stand alongside them in their darkest hour — countries that were in Iran’s crosshairs due to the war President Trump launched against their advice.

The administration’s belated discovery of the need to take allies seriously is progress. But it’s also a confession.

The gap between Rubio’s diplomacy last month and the diplomacy that should have happened before and after the war commenced has been a feature of Trump’s foreign policy, not a bug. That disregard for the basic blocking and tackling of effective statecraft was a gaping hole in the overall U.S. war plan that hamstrung the effort — a failure reflected in the memorandum of understanding that ended the conflict on terms largely favorable to Iran.

The war was the most vivid demonstration in a generation of what American power looks like when one of its most important components — diplomacy — is stripped from the arsenal. Blessed with a stable of global allies that together comprise a vast percentage of the world’s diplomatic, military and economic capacity, Trump never even gestured at building a supportive coalition.

Contempt, not consultation, was the order of the day. Zero sustained effort was made to address the concerns — much less enlist the backing — of Gulf states that warned they would bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation, European allies whose economies depended on Hormuz, or Asian partners for whom Gulf oil was their economic lifeblood.

The decision for war was taken unilaterally in Washington. The missiles fell in the Gulf while the economic shockwaves hit the hardest in Europe and Asia.

When the going got tough — when Hormuz closed, oil prices spiked and Trump’s quick campaign to collapse a brittle enemy settled into a costly stalemate — America turned around for help and found no one there. NATO’s strongest allies flatly refused to send forces to help reopen the strait. After suffering a year’s worth of sustained abuse — tariff wars, threats to conquer Greenland, incessant disparagement — the chickens came home to roost.

Is Trump capable of learning the obvious lesson? Alliances are not a switch you flip when you’re in trouble. They are relationships built over time through sustained investment and mutual respect. Allies are not easy marks to be extorted but force multipliers that lend critical resources and legitimacy to US policy. Treat them as adversaries to be mocked and don’t be surprised when they’re unavailable at your moment of greatest need.

And need them America will to help mitigate further damage from Trump’s war. Two areas where concerted diplomacy could still materially improve the outcome stand out.

The first is Hormuz. The memorandum commits Iran to reopening the strait but leaves its long-term governance dangerously ambiguous. The overwhelming majority of nations want a return to the status quo ante — no Iranian fees or coercive regulation.

U.S. diplomacy needs to weaponize that consensus to underscore Iran’s isolation. That includes tabling a binding United Nations Security Council resolution demanding a restoration of the strait’s pre-war status. China and Russia blocked such efforts while the war raged, but both have an interest in a free and open Hormuz. With the guns silent, diplomacy may build leverage that military pressure couldn’t.

The second is the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The memorandum of understanding ceded important economic leverage before those talks have begun. Rebuilding negotiating power includes assembling the broadest possible coalition around a common definition of an acceptable final deal — one that neutralizes Iran’s enriched uranium, imposes permanent limits on further enrichment and ends Tehran’s financing of proxies. These are goals shared by U.S. partners across the Gulf, Europe, and Asia and a united front pushing for them is badly needed leverage waiting to be forged.

Importantly, the joint statement Rubio issued with his Gulf counterparts last week spoke powerfully on these and other issues. It was an excellent start that needs to be expanded and sustained as part of a comprehensive strategy to rejuvenate U.S. post-war leverage.

Following America’s 250th birthday, Trump could do worse than heed the Declaration of Independence’s counsel that America’s interests are best served by demonstrating “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”

John Hannah is a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America who served as national security advisor to former Vice President Dick Cheney.