Michael Saylor Better Hope Bitcoin Doesn't Rise Too Much

\ Strategy ($MSTR) is down roughly 80% and Wall Street seems to be burying Michael Saylor's company. But, like with everything, it's worth checking whether the numbers tell a different story. And that includes one of the strangest risks out there: the one that can go off if Saylor does too well. In late May 2026, Strategy sold 32 bitcoins. For a company whose founding dogma was never sell , it was practically heresy. But look at the size: around 2.5 million dollars, at a price barely above its cost, 0.0038% of its treasury. Yes — not even 0.01%. An accounting entry that at any other company wouldn't have earned so much as a footnote. In the sessions that followed, the stock fell about 20%. That disproportion — an operationally irrelevant move read as a solvency event — is (maybe) the entire media story of Strategy right now. A step back, for those just arriving. Strategy (formerly MicroStrategy) turned a software company into a machine for stacking bitcoin with other people's money: it issued shares and cheap debt, bought bitcoin, the price went up, and with that pricier stock it issued and bought more. A wheel that spun on its own… as long as the market was partying. In 2026 bitcoin fell by half, the wheel stalled, and to pay its investors it had to sell those 32 bitcoin. Hence the panic. Nobody disputes the market's verdict — it's been almost unanimous — and it's worth laying it out in its harshest, coldest version before arguing with it. Concretely: Michael Saylor's stock fell more than 80% from its high. The company is carrying an unrealized loss of about 13.6 billion dollars on its bitcoin. Its flagship "digital credit" instrument, STRC, designed to trade "fixed" at 100 dollars, lost parity and sank to 72, forcing the company to raise its yield (now at 12.00%) and pay dividends twice a month to hold up demand. And on June 26, for the first time, the market valued its entire capital-and-debt stack below the value of the bitcoin it holds. Some flat-out call it Saylor's Ponzi. Each of those facts is true — but the conclusion people draw from them is what deserves a second look. ==Let's start with the number that shows up in every headline: MSTR trades 42% below its bitcoin.== But there isn't a single measure of that discount: there are three, and the distance between them isn't about the bitcoin — it's about the ~22.2 billion dollars of debt and preferreds that get paid before the common shareholder. So the debate isn't whether Saylor is a genius or a fraud, but whether bitcoin's price can travel a very specific path: neither so low that the issuance machine shuts off, nor so high that it triggers a tax it can't pay. The three ways to measure the discount (A note: the prices and ratios in this section are from the late-June 2026 low; the stock rebounded hard afterward. We'll get to that at the end.) The headline is just one thing: MSTR trades at 0.58 times the value of its bitcoin holdings. This is known as simple mNAV . Concretely, it's the market cap of the shares divided by the market value of the treasury. Put another way, it says that for every dollar of bitcoin Strategy holds, the market pays 58 cents. A 42% discount. If that were the whole story, the takeaway would be that the market thinks Saylor's bitcoin, for some reason, is worth quite a bit less than everyone else's. But simple mNAV makes a framing error, and it becomes obvious the moment you ask what you're actually buying when you buy a share of MSTR. \ What is mNAV? It's a way to compare how much the company is worth on the market against how much the bitcoin it holds is worth. Above 1, the market values it above its bitcoin (it pays a premium). Below 1, it values it below. There are two ways to calculate it — counting only the shares, or counting the debts too — and almost all the market's confusion comes from mixing them up. \ The point is to understand that when you buy a company you don't just buy its assets — you also inherit its debts. The metric that captures this is called enterprise-value-adjusted mNAV : it adds the debt and preferred shares to the market cap, subtracts the cash, and only then divides by the bitcoin . It's the full structural cost. By analogy, it's like appraising a house and adding in its mortgage. And here comes the first jolt: measured this way, Strategy's discount isn't 42%. It's zero. Adjusted mNAV comes to 0.99. The market is valuing the entire company (shares, debt, and preferreds, net of cash) at practically the same as its bitcoin. A fair caveat worth adding: that calculation uses the face value of the debt and preferreds, not their market value — and since both trade at a discount (debt ~7%, preferreds ~28%), at market value the June-low 0.99 dropped to ~0.89. It doesn't change the core point (the common still trades near its share of the bitcoin), and it even reinforces something we'll see later: if the preferreds trade that far below par, buying them back at a discount is even more accretive. The third measure is the most uncomfortable, and the only one that really matters to the common shareholder, because it calculates how much bitcoin is left for them after everyone ahead of them gets paid. The math is simple and direct: from the ~51 billion dollars of bitcoin you subtract the ~22.2 billion of debt and preferreds that have payment priority. That leaves about 28.8 billion attributable to the common shareholder. And how much does the market value that common shareholder at? About 29.5 billion. ==In other words: the common shareholder isn't trading at a discount to its share of the bitcoin== . It's trading slightly above it, at 1.03 times. \ The famous "42% discount" isn't the market doubting Saylor's "digital gold." It's, simply, leverage. \ Saying "MSTR is worth 42% less than its bitcoin" and saying "MSTR's common shareholder is a subordinated, leveraged claim trading at par with what it's owed" are two sentences describing exactly the same financial reality. The first sounds like a Ponzi or a scam; the second, like a corporate-finance class. And almost all the analysis out there picks the first. There's an even finer detail hidden in that 0.99. If enterprise value is barely below the bitcoin, the market is assigning a value of zero (or slightly negative) to the software business. You take the bitcoin at par and the rest comes free. The bearish read is that this "freebie" is actually the price the market puts on the structure's risk: on the dividends that have to be paid no matter what, on the tax lurking around the corner, on the chance that the machine ends up grinding the shareholder down. That architecture turns the common stock into something like the final installment on a mortgaged house (back to the earlier example): the owner keeps only what's left after paying the bank. Since that debt is a fixed number, below a certain bitcoin price the shareholder is left with nothing (around 26,000 dollars) and, above it, what's left grows much faster than Bitcoin itself. \ \ All of this leaves a conclusion that's neither "bargain" nor "trap," but something more precise: MSTR isn't cheap. It's a leveraged residual claim, fairly valued for what it is. And leverage, as always, cuts both ways. A leveraged claim, however, only turns catastrophic if something forces it to be unwound at the worst possible moment. Judging by the panic those 32 bitcoins caused, the market treats that question as settled. But Strategy's structure suggests otherwise. The floor: there's no liquidation price, but there is a date What forces a leveraged holder to sell at the worst moment? One thing only: a margin call. The lender watches the value of the collateral and, if it drops below a set threshold, demands more collateral or liquidates the position automatically, with no room to negotiate. That's the mechanism that destroyed most of those who tried to lever up on Bitcoin in earlier cycles. And it's precisely the mechanism that Strategy's financial structure doesn't include. There's no Bitcoin price at which a creditor can claim the coins or force their sale. That absence is no accident: it's by design. The explanation is in the debt itself. The 6,754 million dollars Strategy owes are structured as senior unsecured convertible bonds, meaning no Bitcoin was pledged as collateral. As a result, a price drop doesn't let creditors seize the treasury, because the treasury never backed the debt. On top of that, it's extraordinarily cheap financing (with coupons between 0% and 2.25%) implying an annual interest cost of around 35 million dollars, a figure the software business practically covers on its own. Add a maturity calendar staggered out to 2032 and net leverage close to 8% of assets. In traditional banking terms, Strategy is barely leveraged. The preferred shares finish sealing the flank, though it's worth being precise so as not to overstate it. Being perpetual, they have no maturity, so the company is never obligated to return the capital. That eliminates refinancing risk at the root (key in leveraged structures). But they aren't free: the dividends on the most important series (especially STRC, at about 1,260 million dollars a year at 12.00%)are cumulative and, if skipped, trigger punitive clauses that raise the rate and grant voting rights to the holders. The obligation, then, isn't about principal but about cash flow, and it's very demanding. The difference, however, is decisive: debt with a maturity can push a company into insolvency on a specific date; a skipped dividend makes financing more expensive and weakens your negotiating position, but it doesn't force you to part with the assets. Strategy turned a liability that had to be repaid into one that simply has to be sustained. And for how long can it sustain it? Even assuming the most extreme scenario, where it paid every dividend solely by selling Bitcoin, without issuing a single additional share or raising new financing, the current treasury would cover roughly thirty years of payments. Put another way — and here's the figure that dismantles much of the bear case: it's enough for Bitcoin to appreciate between 2.3% and 3.3% a year (barely above inflation) for the portfolio itself to fund the entire dividend scheme indefinitely, with no need to dilute shareholders. There's no Bitcoin price at which the structure collapses from a solvency problem; there is, at most, a price above which holding it becomes more uncomfortable. And when the moment finally comes to raise cash through sales, Strategy won't be cornered the way the bears tend to claim, either. Its average cost of acquisition (75,651 dollars per Bitcoin) is actually a statistical mean that can lead to wrong conclusions. The company didn't buy its whole position at that price, but over six years and in very different market conditions. \ \ As the histogram shows, there's a cluster of about 170,000 bitcoin bought below 50,000 dollars (some even at 10,000), which are clearly and deeply in profit. ==And this gives it tax optionality. It can sell winning lots to raise cash, or losing lots to harvest tax losses, choosing the outcome.== The sale of those famous 32 bitcoin, executed at 77,135 dollars (right at the average), wasn't the desperate grab of someone selling the only thing they have left. It was the choice of the most tax-neutral lot. A treasury operation — almost surgical, I'd say. So far, the bull case. We could stop here and declare victory. The problem is that it would be dishonest, because the structure does have a real pressure point, even with a date, and it's the only one that truly matters. \ What is a bond "put"? When Strategy issued some of its convertible bonds, it gave investors the right to demand repayment in cash on certain dates or under certain conditions. If the share price is well above the conversion price, they'll usually prefer to convert the bond into shares and not exercise that right. But if the stock trades below the conversion price, the incentive flips: many will prefer to get their money back. If a significant share of holders exercise it at the same time, the company has to have the liquidity to meet those payments. \ Strategy's conversion prices range from 142 to 672 dollars, and the stock trades near 100 as of this writing . If it stays depressed when those dates arrive, no holder will convert: they'll all exercise the put and demand cash (around 5,900 million dollars become payable in cash between September 2027 and September 2028). One thing worth flagging: the famous USD Reserve, the "cushion" the company created to reassure institutions, with coverage for two and a half years of dividends. It was raided in May 2026 to buy back 1,500 million in debt, falling to 871 million, and rebuilt to 1,400 million by issuing shares — that is, by diluting. By mid-June it covered barely 9.8 months. On June 29 the company raised it to 2,550 million dollars (17.4 months) and set a formal floor of twelve. But this, without taking anything away from it, is easy to do: it's simply moving capital around. The verdict for this part is that Strategy not only has no liquidation price, but its liabilities don't mature, it holds deeply profitable Bitcoin lots to raise cash, and it has decades of nominal coverage to spare. But it's carrying a cash-demand window in 2027–2028 that it won't be able to refill if Bitcoin stays depressed in that period. Although… there's something underneath that forces us to ask what "depressed" even means, and relative to what. "The mirage" It would seem that every media discussion about Strategy boils down, at bottom, to one word: loss. The bear says it lost 13.6 billion; the bull, that it never made so much. Could both be right at once? This can be settled through an accounting lens. First let's see what BTC Yield involves and why it was created. It's the metric Saylor patented to soften the price-volatility risk: it measures the percentage change (period to period) in the ratio between the bitcoin the company holds and its diluted shares. But the key is in what that formula leaves out: it divides physical coins by shares, and therefore the dollar price never enters the calculation. That's why Bitcoin's collapse from 125,000 to 59,000 dollars has zero effect on this metric. And the numbers, under this lens, are cause for celebration: 22.8% for all of 2025, 9.4% in the first quarter of 2026, 13.3% cumulative through May. Translated into units, the company generated 89,378 additional bitcoin for its diluted shareholders in the middle of the price crash. Seen this way, 2026 is a triumph: there was never so much bitcoin per share. The metric says you own more satoshis per share today than yesterday. That accretion exists and isn't an accounting trick. But it becomes a mirage if you look at it from the only thing creditors and the taxman care about: value in dollars. You can show off a triumphant BTC Yield while the value of the collateral backing 22 billion in obligations crumbles. The metric measures how the numerator grows while looking away from the denominator of solvency. \ In plain English · "mark-to-market" (ASU 2023-08). It's a new accounting rule that forces Strategy to record, every three months, how much its bitcoin would be worth if it sold today. If the price went up, it books a giant gain; if it went down, a giant loss. Even though not a single dollar came in or went out, the problem shows up later… with taxes. \ Now to the second way of looking at all this, which points in the exact opposite direction. And which, on top of that, wasn't a perspective the company chose but one imposed by an accounting rule. ==Since January 1, 2025, the ASU 2023-08 standard forces Strategy to value its bitcoin at market price and to run every quarterly swing directly through net income.== On the way up, that manufactured out of thin air a net gain of 10,000 million dollars in the second quarter of 2025 (money that never landed in any account). On the way down, the unrealized loss of 14,460 million from the first quarter of 2026 forced a net accounting loss of 12,540 million, with earnings per share of minus 38.25 dollars. The big headline in every outlet. And yet, not a single dollar left the company: it's a mark that reverses if bitcoin's price recovers. The ironic part (or not) is that this rule was requested by Saylor himself. For years he lobbied the U.S. accounting body to adopt fair value, fed up with the old model — cost less impairment — that only let you book the losses and never the recoveries, leaving the balance sheet permanently dented even when Bitcoin's price rose. And while he won that battle, the same rule that inflated his earnings into the stratosphere on the way up is the one that today manufactures apocalyptic headlines on the way down. The same quarter, seen through the two lenses, looks like this: \ The honest read is that neither of the two verdicts is the true one. The GAAP number overstates the damage by being non-cash, reversible, and touching neither solvency nor the ability to pay dividends. BTC Yield overstates the health by not stopping at the 13.6-billion hole that creditors and the taxman do count. The truth about cash probably lives in the middle. The market's error — and the opportunity for whoever reads it well — is to confuse the GAAP lens with actual cash: overreacting to a 12.5-billion loss that never liquidated a single dollar. Why did Saylor fight so hard for something that could end up being the most dangerous decision he made? The same rule that turns a paper gain into reported profit also turns it into taxable profit. And, to be concrete, a tax is the only thing on this entire balance sheet that demands real cash. A European company would dodge the trap, since under international standards those gains would go straight to equity without touching the income statement, sidestepping in one move both the accounting issue and the tax one. Strategy, being American, can't. The only company on Wall Street that has to pray its asset doesn't rise too much Almost all the analysis out there discusses a single risk (the death spiral), and on top of that discusses it as if it were the only one possible. Concretely: if Bitcoin's price falls, issuance jams, the dividends strain the cash, and, as a finale, the company bleeds out. It's a real risk, already taken apart piece by piece. But it's only one jaw of a vise. ==Strategy is trapped between two opposite risks that fire under contrary conditions: while the death spiral needs Bitcoin's price to fall, the other jaw needs it to rise.== Below an mNAV of 1.22, issuing shares stops adding and starts subtracting. Funding dividends by selling paper at a discount erodes the very bitcoin-per-share the whole project exists to grow. With the reserve now reinforced to 17.4 months but the 5,900 million dollars of puts compressed into 2027–2028, a Bitcoin price that stays depressed slowly closes this vise. It's the risk the market obsesses over, and it's right to take it seriously. What the consensus missed was the other jaw. There's a tax in the United States called CAMT that levies 15% on companies whose accounting income averages more than 1,000 million dollars over three years. The problem is the connection with the rule from the previous section: since "mark-to-market" forces you to count unrealized gains as part of that income, the tax doesn't look at what the company collected — it looks at what Bitcoin rose on paper. If Bitcoin's price recovers strongly, Strategy could owe 15% in real cash on profits it never realized. \ In plain English · the CAMT tax. The United States has a tax that levies large companies based on the profit they show on their balance sheets. Under the new "mark-to-market" rule, that profit includes how much the bitcoin appreciated without having sold it. The consequence? If Bitcoin's price rises hard, Strategy could have to pay 15% in cash on a gain that only exists on paper. \ Despite intense institutional lobbying, the Treasury's guidance (the 2025 and 2026 notices) deliberately refused to exempt crypto "mark-to-market" from the calculation, even while granting relief for other instruments. The friction, moreover, is already visible in the numbers: in the first quarter of 2026 the company had to set up a provision of 2,230 million dollars, writing down deferred tax assets it now doubts it can use. And here's where you understand why Strategy's safe road isn't "up." It has to travel a corridor defined on two axes, as this figure shows: \ \ Today's point, with Bitcoin's price at ~60,000 dollars, sits in the amber danger zone; the green survival lane is above, but capped by a ceiling; and the red gates marked are the dates the debt becomes payable in cash. What that geometry does is turn the whole discussion into a question of probability. The market, incredibly spooked by just 32 bitcoins sold, is pricing the probability that Strategy crashes into one of the walls. The verdict: nobody calculated the probability of making it through In short, the conclusion is that the market is obsessively pricing a single scenario, and in doing so commits three errors in one: It confuses leverage with a discount. The "42% cheaper than its bitcoin" isn't the market doubting the underlying asset — it's the 22 billion of senior capital casting its shadow over the common stock, which actually trades at par with what it's owed. It anchors on GAAP accounting. It reacted to the 12,540-million loss as if it were money that left the company's coffers. Not only did not a cent leave, but it's a mark that reverses on its own if Bitcoin rises. It read the sale of 32 bitcoin as the end of the world. A tax-neutral treasury operation triggered a 20% drop in the stock afterward. The market saw it as the first domino of a forced-liquidation chain. ==And there's the root of the overreaction: the market is pricing the ghost of Three Arrows and Celsius, not the thing in front of it, which was surgically designed to have none of those fates.== For the bears to win, two things have to happen at once: Bitcoin has to not only fall, but stay down through that entire 18-month window, and Strategy has to get there with no cheap coins to sell. And here's the nice part: the two threats step on each other. The tax only shows up if Bitcoin rises hard… but that same rise puts mNAV back above 1.22 and reopens the share-issuance machine — which is exactly what would pay that tax. For one jaw of the vise to close, the other has to open. The only road that really kills it is the one down the middle: Bitcoin dragging sideways and down through 2027 and 2028. Then, yes, the reserve runs out, the bondholders ask for their cash, and the company ends up diluting the shareholder at the worst moment. It's a possible ending — but it's also true that it's a single one, and quite a bit narrower than the panic implies. And with that we get to the point. This isn't a buy recommendation: this article's claim isn't "MSTR will go up." It's something smaller and more defensible: that today's price has priced in far more fear of hitting those limits, up and down, than any calculation of whether it simply makes it through the corridor. And fear, in markets, always has a price. So the question we opened with seems to have an answer: it's neither a bargain nor a trap — it's simply a bet on whether Bitcoin can make it through a narrow corridor of price and time. If Saylor ends up being right, it'll be because the market priced the risk over 32 bitcoin but forgot to run all the numbers. No believing or not believing: test the hypothesis A hypothesis that can't be refuted isn't analysis but faith, so this article closes with a scoreboard. The following are the concrete, public, dated signals that tell the reader which way the balance is tipping, quarter by quarter: \ \ The decisive detail is which boxes remain contested. Two of the ones that were red (the reserve and STRC) already jumped to green; mNAV is the lagging indicator left, and it reacts to a cheap Bitcoin — it doesn't cause it. All of them depend, at bottom, on a single box: that Bitcoin reclaim its cost before the maturity window opens. If that single cell turns green, the others follow almost mechanically: mNAV re-expands above 1.22 and the issuance machine reopens. A single variable unlocks the whole cascade . If instead it stays red through 2027 and 2028, the thesis collapses. The article doesn't ask you to guess which of the two happens. It hands you these lines so you can keep the scoreboard yourself, quarter by quarter, and see in real time whether Saylor was right or whether this time "this time is different" was false. Postscript: the thesis, executed in real time While this article was being finished, Strategy did something worth watching closely. On June 29 it announced a "Digital Credit Capital Framework" with five tools: a formal USD Reserve policy, a hike to the STRC dividend, a preferred-share buyback program, a common-share buyback program, and a Bitcoin monetization program. The reserve and rate figures that appear in the body of this article already reflect that announcement. The most important change is the one that renders the bears' strongest argument obsolete. The reserve, which in mid-June covered 9.8 months and was flirting with the S&P downgrade trigger, jumped to 2,550 million dollars: 17.4 months of coverage, with a formal floor of twelve . Adding the already-authorized Bitcoin-sale capacity, total coverage climbs to 3,800 million, nearly 26 months. The reddest box on the scoreboard turned green in real time. This is exactly what doing analysis is for. Not to be right, but to find out in time when reality moves. \ "We are moving from one-way capital issuance to active capital management." — Phong Le, CEO of Strategy, that same day. \ The two buyback tools are the elegant move the analysis anticipated. Buying back a preferred that trades at 72 retires a liability of 100 by paying 72 and also cuts its 12% dividend. The bears said "the dividends are strangling it"; the company just showed that, if the paper trades cheap, it can remove them by buying them. And understand that buying back the common below 1x mNAV is the flywheel in reverse: if the common is worth less than its bitcoin-per-share, buying it creates value instead of destroying it. It's the direct structural answer to the belief that the engine breaks below 1. But let's not buy the press release, which is what separates this article from a repost of Saylor's account. "Bitcoin is capital," said the CFO, and that phrase is the official death certificate of "never sell," since it implies a real loss for the ideological premium that propped up part of MSTR's price. Announcing a defensive arsenal is, in itself, a sign of a regime change. It seems clear that a company publishing buybacks, Bitcoin monetization, and a reserve floor is managing stress. STRC, moreover, recovered parity after the hike — the "par-seeking" working as designed — but at the cost of a 12% dividend: an extremely high cost of capital on a 10,500-million liability. And the buybacks are "up to 1,000 million" and discretionary: ammunition, not commitment, and barely 6% of the 15,500 million in preferreds. Significant, not transformative. Above all, one thing didn't move: the framework doesn't touch the ~5,900 million dollars of convertible puts clustered in 2027–2028. The variable everything still hangs on — that Bitcoin reclaim its cost before that window — is intact. Strategy bought itself some air; it didn't move the date. The scoreboard moved. Worth keeping an eye on it. And in the following days it moved more. The stock jumped to ~101 dollars, a not-negligible rebound of about 23% off the low (+7.9% in a single session), with enterprise-value mNAV going from 0.99 to 1.07. With that, the market stopped valuing Strategy below its bitcoin and started valuing it a bit above. For the common shareholder the gap flipped entirely: from trading at par it went to a premium of ~21% (a look-through mNAV of ~1.21), a step away from the 1.22 where issuance becomes accretive again. Does it validate the thesis? No, since Bitcoin is still below cost and the 2027–28 window is still there. But it's the market starting to re-price the fear. Which is, exactly, the gap we flagged. And there is a closing point that sums it all up. Between June 29 and July 5, Strategy sold again. This time it was 3,588 BTC (around US$216 million) to pay dividends and strengthen its reserve. This was one hundred times the 32 coins from May, and yet it barely represented 0.4% of its treasury, which stood at 843,775 BTC. The market reacted again (Bitcoin fell by ~3%, with ETF outflows), but not in proportion to the volume. The contrast sweetens the article, since while in May 32 coins cost the stock 20%, now a sale one hundred times larger caused only about a ~3% drop in Bitcoin, which reversed within days, with the stock price rebounding higher. Bitcoin is now trading above where it was when I wrote this (~US$63,500 versus ~US$60,000). This is the “inoculation” Saylor was aiming for, playing out live. The move that once triggered panic now barely moves the needle. Coda: it's not about Saylor. It's about how we look One last thing, and it's not about Strategy. It's about us, the ones watching. It's much easier and more comfortable to join the media noise than to sit down and read the fine print of a strange structure and ask whether the noise wasn't overblown. The market does this all the time. Saylor may end up being right or he may blow up trying — but both are possible and neither is written. But the question worth asking isn't about Saylor — it's about whether we're capable of understanding what 32 bitcoins actually represent within this whole structure. That difference, between looking and fearing, is almost the whole game. In markets, as in almost everything, the one who does the analysis wins slowly; the one who panics pays all at once. This is not investment advice or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any asset. It's a reading exercise: trying to understand an unusual financial structure instead of a headline. The figures in the body correspond to the late-June 2026 close (with the price update as of July 5 noted at the end) and come from the company's own reports and its public metrics dashboard; Bitcoin and stocks move every day, so verify the numbers before using them. Always do your own analysis. Sources Primary company documents (available on the SEC's EDGAR system, sec.gov, and on the investor portal, strategy.com): Strategy Inc. — Form 8-K, June 29, 2026 : "Digital Credit Capital Framework" (USD Reserve policy; STRC dividend rate hike to 12.00%; Digital Credit and class A common stock repurchase programs of up to US$1,000M each; BTC monetization program; ATM and BTC holdings updates; conditional STRC dividend declaration). Strategy Inc. — Press release, June 29, 2026 : "Strategy Announces Digital Credit Capital Framework, USD Reserve Policy, STRC Dividend Policy, Digital Credit and MSTR Repurchase Authorizations, and BTC Monetization Program." Strategy Inc. — Form 10-Q for Q1 2026 (May 6, 2026): impact of ASU 2023-08, GAAP net loss of US$12,540M (EPS −US$38.25), valuation allowance of US$2,230M. Strategy Inc. — Form 8-K, May 26, 2026 : repurchase of US$1,500M of 2029 convertible notes; BTC Yield of 13.3% YTD. Strategy Inc. — Form 8-K, May 2026 : net sale of 32 BTC. Strategy Inc. — Form 10-K (FY 2025) : capital structure and risk factors (including CAMT). Strategy Inc. — Official metrics dashboard (strategy.com and strategy.com/strc) and the mNAV definition at strategy.com/notes. Michael Saylor (@saylor) and Strategy — posts on X, June–July 2026. External sources: S&P Global Ratings — "Strategy Inc. 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating; Outlook Stable" (December 2025; affirmed in 2026). FASB — Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2023-08, fair-value accounting for crypto assets (effective January 1, 2025). U.S. Department of the Treasury / IRS — Notices 2025-49 and 2026-7, interim guidance on the CAMT. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 — establishment of the 15% CAMT on adjusted financial statement income (AFSI). The cost-basis distribution figures by price range (Figure 2) were reconstructed from the company's public quarterly series of holdings and average cost. \ \