Iran launches drone, missile attacks on dissident bases in Iraqi Kurdistan

On July 1 and 2, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hit a Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) camp near Erbil in Iraq's Kurdistan region with two ballistic missiles and two drones. Fighters from this Iranian Kurdish militia are established in this region of eastern Iraq, near the border with the Islamic Republic.

Videos posted by locals from a distance during the night showed massive fires.

The Iranian IRGC hit camps belonging to at least two other Iranian dissident Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan with missiles, rockets and drones within a 48-hour period.

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The operations followed at least four reported clashes between Iranian forces and Kurdish dissident armed groups in Mahabad, Saravan and Paveh in Iran’s Kurdish region. Five IRGC members were killed during the fighting on June 29 and 30, according to Tehran, while six fighters from the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan were killed on July 1, and four men from another Kurdish group, PJAK, reportedly died on June 30.

The tensions come against the backdrop of the US-Israel war on Iran, which broke out on February 28. A New York Times article in May 2026 also claimed that some Kurdish groups were expected to begin attacks and advance inside Iran as part of the initial Israeli-US war plan, but that US President Donald Trump changed his mind at the last moment and did not approve the attack. The Kurdish groups, for their part, denied receiving any weapons.

In the initial days of the conflict, Israeli jets bombed border posts between Iran and the Iraqi Kurdistan region and Iranian military bases near the border – areas where Kurdish militia groups are active. Meanwhile, Iran launched dozens of drone, rocket and missile attacks on Iranian Kurdish militia camps in Iraqi Kurdistan.

According to Kurdish parties, these drone and missile attacks left five dead among the militia and one 17-year-old boy, while the Iranian side claims dozens of deaths. The FRANCE 24 Observers team could not independently verify the real number of casualties of these attacks.

Four Iranian Kurdish groups

There are four primary Kurdish dissident groups in Iran, operating as both political and military organisations. Historically, the two main independent Iranian Kurdish dissident parties with military branches have been Komala, founded in the 1960s, and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, founded in the 1940s. The other two groups are more recent: the PAK (2006) and the PJAK (2004), affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK was the primary armed Kurdish movement active in Iraq and Turkey until it announced its dissolution in May 2025. The EU, the US and Israel have designated the PKK as a “terrorist” group for years.

During the war, the attacks remained unilateral, with Iran targeting Komala and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.

After the announced US-Iran ceasefire on June 17, some Iranian Kurdish militia groups began attacks on Iranian forces, including assassinations of IRGC members and ambushes. In recent weeks, several clashes have broken out within Iranian Kurdistan between the IRGC and both the PJAK and forces of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.

‘The Islamic Republic appears to feel more confident’

Saman Rasoulpour, a London-based journalist and expert on Iran’s Kurdish region, told our team:

“Following the recent war involving the United States, Israel and Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to feel more confident and has increased pressure on both the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government to disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Tehran has also pursued requests against the leaders of these groups through Interpol, while continuing drone and missile attacks on their bases in Iraq.

The attacks have targeted the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala and PAK (the Kurdistan Freedom Party). PJAK, however, has barely been directly targeted, likely because many of its forces are based in difficult mountainous and border areas, and because a significant part of them are present inside Iranian Kurdistan itself.

The Islamic Republic has also intensified pressure on the Kurdish population through some sections of pro-regime Kurdish tribes, alongside a wider security crackdown on civil activists. On July 1, a 19-year-old man was stabbed to death in Mahabad by a member of one of these groups. These developments have contributed to anti-regime protests.”

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‘Iranian Kurdish military commanders who fought ISIS (Islamic State group) in Syria joined PJAK'

Groups such as PJAK, and to some extent the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, are using their increased field activity and these clashes to send a political and military message: that they cannot be easily eliminated or forced into submission.

Some analysts believe this may be an attempt to push the Islamic Republic to recognise that a purely military solution is impossible, potentially creating the basis for dialogue or some form of settlement in the future.

Previously, there was a degree of restraint among Kurdish groups to avoid a full-scale war.

These groups now believe they have greater operational independence to respond militarily, because they feel they can justify their actions without being seen merely as instruments of broader US or Israeli interests.

In the case of PJAK, there is also a specific tactical factor. With the ceasefire between the PKK and Turkey, and the shifting dynamics of the Syrian conflict, some experienced Kurdish fighters have refocused their attention on Iran.

A number of Iranian Kurdish military commanders who fought ISIS in Syria have returned to Iranian Kurdistan and joined PJAK, bringing advanced military experience and a record of field cooperation with international forces in the anti-ISIS campaign, including the US.

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‘During the war between Israel, the US and Iran, these groups avoided reckless action’

During the US-Israeli war on Iran in April 2026, Trump claimed that the US had transferred weapons to Kurdish groups, and that they were supposed to move these weapons inside Iran, but “the Kurds kept them”.

The Kurdish groups deny these claims. There is also no record, during this period, of military action by Komala or the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan inside Iran.

Rasoulpour said Kurdish groups remain wary because of past experiences – notably in Syria, where “they felt abandoned after helping advance American interests”.

“Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, which currently cooperate with one another through a coalition of Iranian Kurdistan parties, welcome engagement with major powers. But at the same time, they want to be seen as independent actors with their own clear goals and demands, not as tools of foreign powers.

During the recent war involving Israel, the United States and Iran, these groups deliberately avoided reckless action so they would not be blamed for bloodshed or labelled as part of a US-Israel war package.

Their approach to Israel is more cautious than their view of the United States, because they are still uncertain about Israel’s real long-term plans.

There have been reports suggesting the possibility of US-led military operations against Iran with the participation of Kurdish groups. But as far as I can see, Kurdish leaders have shown no unconditional willingness to take part.

Their cooperation is usually conditional and requires clear answers about the future political structure and the specific share Kurds would have in any future Iranian system.

Without such guarantees, they fear entering a campaign that would only increase the political and military costs for their society.”

On July 3, the PJAK said its guerrilla forces were “in a position of legitimate defence, not in a position of attack”, adding that it was “not in favour of expanding a comprehensive war in the region” because it believed the Islamic Republic intended to use the war “as a pretext to legitimise its internal repressions”.