Iran’s strikes show its priority is flexing muscle on Hormuz, not dealing with Trump

One would think Iran would be happy with the new postwar reality.

After successfully using strikes on neighbors and threats against shipping in the Strait of Hormuz to spook Donald Trump into halting his military campaign in April, the US president signed a memorandum of understanding that achieved none of the US-Israeli war aims, imposed a stop to Israel’s fight against Hezbollah, required no concessions on Iran’s nuclear program, and opened the door for billions of dollars of sanctions relief.

The regime in Tehran is reasonably secure, its proxies have survived, and after withstanding over a month of heavy fire, its regional position is stronger than it was before the war.

During negotiations, Iran’s leaders were able to bask in Trump calling them “very rational people” who are “nice to deal with.”

Now they seem to be doing everything they can to convince Trump they are anything but.

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Trump’s main achievement with the MOU was getting the Iranians to agree to open Hormuz, but on July 7, Tehran struck three commercial oil tankers in the vital strait, leading to US strikes against dozens of Iranian military sites.

Iran could have let the flare-up end there, but it escalated, launching missiles and drones that it said hit 85 US military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait.

Now, Trump is singing a different tune. He raised the possibility that the US-Iran MOU “is over” and called the same  Iranian leaders “scum” and “vicious, violent people.” And he said on Monday that the US was reinstating its blockade on Iranian oil.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to escalate, declaring Hormuz totally closed and targeting Bahrain, Jordan and two tankers associated with the United Arab Emirates early Tuesday alone.

To outsiders, it looks like Iran got 20 at the blackjack table and decided to hit. But for the Islamic Republic, it’s worth the risk of busting the MOU and ceasefire to show the world who holds the cards over the all-important Strait of Hormuz.

Iran “seems to be prioritizing its control over the Strait of Hormuz over avoiding a return to the conflict,” said Annika Ganzeveld of the Critical Threats Project in Washington.

It’s all about that strait

To Iran’s new leadership, there is one result from its recent — and its in eyes, victorious — fight against the US and Israel that stands out above all others.

“Hormuz is the most meaningful achievement of the war for Iran,” said Raz Zimmt, an Iran scholar at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

The strait is one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. About a fifth of all traded oil and natural gas passed through the waterway before the war began.

For decades, despite territorial claims by both Iran and Oman, vessels from around the world have traversed the strait freely under a 1973 traffic separation program defining inbound and outbound shipping lanes.

Though freedom of navigation through Hormuz was usually respected, the Islamic Republic has used threats to close it as a bargaining chip, and has attacked ships on multiple occasions, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War.

It was no secret that Iran would try to shut down the vital strait in the event of a US attack on the country in order to inflict pain on the world economy, thereby increasing pressure on the White House to end its campaign.

Days before the start of the US-Israeli campaign in February, Iran temporarily closed parts of the Strait of Hormuz, citing live fire exercises it dubbed “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz.” It was a clear warning of what would happen if Trump followed through on his threats against the country.

It didn’t take long for Iran to make good on its threat. Hours into the war that began on February 28, Iran warned ships that they would not be able to pass through the strait. It was carrying out deadly attacks on civilian ships by March 1, and two days later, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior official said that the Strait of Hormuz was closed, threatening that if any vessels passed through it, Iran “will set those ships ablaze.”

On March 4, the IRGC declared that Iran had achieved “complete control” of the waterway.

Though shipping traffic dropped off dramatically, Iranian attacks on ships continued throughout March. The closure sent oil prices skyward as economies around the world shuddered.

After the April ceasefire between the US and Iran, and a subsequent one between Israel and Hezbollah, Tehran briefly declared the strait open on April 17, then swiftly reversed course after the US said it would keep its own blockade on Iranian ports in place.

Ever since it showed it can control the strait, Iran has sought for the international community to recognize its administration of the waterway.

On May 5, it established the so-called Persian Gulf Strait Authority, demanding that ships apply for transit permits from the IRGC and pay a hefty fee. This formalized a payoff scheme that analysts said had been ongoing for much of the war.

In June, the US and Iran signed a memorandum aimed at ending the war for good. The document had little to say about Iran’s nuclear program or missile buildup, but included several passages on Hormuz.

The problem is that the US and Iran appear to understand those sections very differently.

Divergent readings

At the heart of the dispute is the MOU’s 5th article, which declares that Iran “will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa.”

It further states that Iran will hold talks with Oman to “define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.”

Iran reads those clauses as giving it authority to determine how and which ships transit, and empowering it to make new arrangements with Oman about controlling the strait, including charging fees to ships passing through.

The US, meanwhile, sees them as prohibiting Iran from doing anything that could interfere with safe passage, including firing at ships and laying mines.

It wants to make sure the new order reflects how Iranians see reality

Now Iran is looking to make sure that it imposes its understanding on everyone else.

“It is using negotiations to consolidate its achievement in the war into a more meaningful agreement,” said Zimmt. “It wants to make sure the new order reflects how Iranians see reality.”

With dozens of vessels crossing a southern corridor through the strait in Omani waters every day, guided by the US Navy, Iran saw its leverage in talks slipping, and with it a formal recognition of its permanent control over Hormuz.

“Iran is attacking shipping to deter anyone who wants to sail out from the Gulf and test Iran’s control,” said Jonathan Ruhe of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America.

Now it is essentially daring Trump to resume a war it knows he wants out of, while flexing its ability to continue controlling a chokepoint that represents a singularly lucrative source of funding that rivals the frozen assets the US has promised to release, without the baggage of significant concessions.

The strategy “reflects longstanding Iranian practice, where it tries to gauge and erode US resolve by ramping up pressure against perceived American weak points,” Ruhe said.

A new normal

Is the Gulf entering an era of regular strikes from the US military on Iran, and from Tehran on Arab neighbors?

It certainly could be.

The past week has only underscored how far apart the two sides are on Hormuz, to say nothing of other sticking points referenced in the MOU, making a comprehensive follow-up deal vanishingly unlikely.

Iran has said it is entirely unwilling to make the minimum concessions on its nuclear program that would meet Trump’s demands, including on ending enrichment and removing highly enriched uranium.

Iran also sees the June 26 Israel-Lebanon-US agreement that demands the disarming of Hezbollah and allows the IDF to remain in Lebanon until the Lebanese army clears it of Hezbollah weapons, as a violation of its MOU with the US, which explicitly called for an end to the fighting in Lebanon.

“Similar to his Gaza plan, Trump got everyone to stop shooting by leaving all the tough questions for later,” said Ruhe, “which creates real tension between reaching a ceasefire and maintaining it.”

Neither the US nor Iran seem to want a return to full-fledged fighting. For Trump, it is a danger ahead of the midterms, and would be evidence that his determination to pursue diplomacy with Tehran was folly.

“Trump, and his party, would like the war’s economic costs to recede before midterms,” said Ruhe. “Iran seems less concerned, since it thinks it won the last war and now holds the better cards.”

Still, Iran would prefer to rebuild its badly damaged arsenal, sell oil, and collect fees from Hormuz traffic than face another intensive bombing campaign across the country.

At the same time, Tehran is showing that it is certainly willing to push the envelope.

It knows that it survived weeks of a carefully planned bombing campaign by Israel and the US, and can withstand whatever they might throw at it in the near future, which would likely be far more limited in terms of time and scope.

With bombs and drones flying around, there is always the possibility of escalation. Iran could kill American troops with its attacks on US bases, or might decide to target Israel, which would lead to an Israeli response.

Iran has avoided doing so during the latest escalation. Unlike the Gulf states, Israel is willing, even eager, and capable of responding in force, and pressure on Jerusalem won’t improve Tehran’s position in Hormuz.

The current reality is actually favorable for Israel, which is unlikely to face the brunt of Iranian attacks thanks to its willingness to hit back.

Iran will get no massive sanctions relief, while the US continues to slowly degrade Tehran’s military capabilities. The restoration of the blockade could deprive Iran of hundreds of millions of dollars in oil sales every day.

The threat that Iran poses will continue to be underscored to Arab countries, raising support for measures that weaken Tehran’s proxies in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.

On a public diplomacy front, it will be far harder to blame the Jewish state for ostensibly dragging Trump into war when the president has bent over backwards to keep a diplomatic process with Iran alive, and has been met by repeated Iranian attacks on US bases and allies.

If that happens, it will be evidence that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu played his cards right — avoiding public criticism of Trump, refraining from hitting Iran, maintaining pressure on Hezbollah, and agreeing to US requests to embark on a diplomatic initiative in Lebanon — after being dealt a horrendous hand when Trump put a premature end to the US-Israeli military campaign.