How Resource-for-Security Deals Are Reshaping Power in Africa

Africa · Central

Key Facts

—The model. African governments grant foreign powers access to critical minerals in return for military protection, training or regime security.

—Washington Accord. In December 2025 the US signed a strategic partnership granting the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium preferential access to DRC copper, cobalt and lithium in exchange for security support against M23 rebels.

—Russia’s playbook. The Africa Corps, successor to the Wagner Group, provides combat support and regime protection in Mali, CAR and Niger in return for gold, diamond and uranium concessions.

—Sahel proposal. Washington has reportedly offered the Alliance of Sahel States a DRC-style minerals-for-security deal, trading counter-terrorism assistance for access to gold, lithium and uranium.

—Sovereignty cost. Analysts warn these bargains erode resource sovereignty, reinforce authoritarian governance and tie security to continued extraction rather than lasting peace.

Resource-for-security deals are rapidly becoming the defining transaction of great-power competition in Africa, exchanging access to cobalt, lithium, gold and uranium for military protection and redrawing alliances from Kinshasa to Bamako.

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The new currency of power

Africa holds roughly 30 per cent of the world’s critical-mineral value, including 85 per cent of global manganese and 80 per cent of platinum and chromium. That endowment has turned the continent into the principal theatre of a superpower rivalry in which minerals are no longer mere commodities but instruments of geopolitical leverage.

The logic is straightforward: governments facing insurgencies, coup threats or chronic instability grant foreign states privileged access to mineral assets in return for military assistance, security guarantees or regime protection. This extends the older resources-for-infrastructure model into the security domain, with protection from rebels and rivals becoming the service purchased with copper, cobalt and rare earths.

Demand for these minerals is surging because they are indispensable for electric vehicles, batteries, artificial-intelligence hardware and modern weapons systems. As our ongoing series Africa: The New Scramble has documented, this has transformed African resource governance into a high-stakes contest among the United States, China, Russia and Gulf states.

Russia’s security-for-concessions playbook

Russian influence is channelled through state-linked private military companies, first the Wagner Group and now its rebranded successor, Africa Corps. These entities provide combat support, training and regime security in fragile states in exchange for mining and energy concessions, a pattern researchers describe as a toxic trade-off that fuels human-rights abuses and long-term instability.

In Mali, Russian-linked contractors have secured gold mining concessions while helping the junta counter jihadist insurgents and internal challengers. In the Central African Republic, facing chronic insurgency, the government granted Russian entities gold and diamond concessions in return for decisive military support defending the capital, embedding Russian leverage deep into political and economic decision-making.

Niger has emerged as another node, with potential uranium access tied to security assistance. The model appeals to leaders facing sanctions or legitimacy crises because it delivers rapid military support without the governance conditions Western partners typically attach.

Washington’s resource-for-security deals in the DRC

The United States is moving from a classic aid-and-training approach toward an explicit something-for-something model. In December 2025, the US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement, known as the Washington Accord, granted the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium preferential access to Congolese copper, cobalt and lithium in return for American support against the M23 rebel movement in the country’s volatile east.

The accord followed months of intensive diplomacy and was framed as part of Washington’s broader strategy to counter Chinese supply-chain dominance in minerals essential for clean-energy, artificial-intelligence and defence industries. A separate US-brokered Critical Minerals for Security and Peace Deal between the DRC and Rwanda, scheduled for signature on 27 June 2025 in Washington, aimed to stabilise the region by facilitating joint extraction and trade of rare earths in exchange for security arrangements that would offset China’s entrenched position.

Taken together, these initiatives amount to a minerals-for-security bargain: access to the DRC’s extraordinary mineral wealth in exchange for American support in stabilising the country. Congolese civil-society groups, however, express growing fears of exploitation, with miners and activists highlighting perceptions that local populations lose out while foreign companies and political elites benefit.

The Sahel becomes the next frontier

Building on its DRC strategy, Washington has reportedly proposed a similar resource-for-security deal to the Alliance of Sahel States, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The offer centres on counter-terrorism assistance and direct military support against jihadist groups in exchange for access to the region’s gold, lithium and uranium deposits.

The Sahel’s combination of jihadist insurgency, recent coups and rich mineral endowments makes it a prime testing ground for this model. Analysts caution, however, that replicating the DRC approach in the Sahel risks entrenching extractive arrangements that enrich foreign powers while leaving local communities marginalised, especially given weak governance and ongoing conflict.

Russia’s Africa Corps already operates across the region, providing counter-insurgency support in return for exclusive control over key natural resources. The result is a layered competition in which Sahelian governments can hedge between Russian and American offers, seeking better terms but also accumulating complex and potentially contradictory dependencies.

China’s quieter but deeper footprint

China remains by far the largest player in African mining, having imported about US$10 billion in rare-earth minerals from the continent in 2022. Beijing dominates global refining capacity, supplying 68 per cent of nickel, 40 per cent of copper, 59 per cent of lithium and 73 per cent of cobalt refining, giving it structural leverage that neither Washington nor Moscow can quickly match.

Its core model remains infrastructure-for-resources under the Belt and Road Initiative, funding transport, energy and port projects in return for mining rights or long-term offtake agreements. Although less explicitly framed as security-for-minerals, China’s port access, base agreements and training missions around key nodes such as Mombasa contribute to a security presence that underpins resource corridors and locks in long-term influence.

For Latin American readers watching their own region’s lithium and copper dynamics, the African experience offers a cautionary parallel. The same great-power competition reshaping the Andes is playing out with higher military stakes across Central Africa and the Sahel.

Sovereignty, authoritarianism and what comes next

African security analysts warn that resource-for-security deals will not save fragile states, arguing that such bargains bind them into asymmetric dependencies, erode sovereignty over natural resources and undermine policy autonomy. Think-tank estimates value Africa’s mineral endowment at around US$29.5 trillion, underscoring the scale of the stakes as these assets become instruments of global hegemonic positioning rather than genuine development partnership.

Comparative research finds that as external actors prioritise supply-chain security and geopolitical positioning, governance conditions weaken, executives are empowered and authoritarian patterns are reinforced. Where private military contractors are paid in concessions, security becomes tied to continued extraction, creating incentives to prolong low-level conflict and suppress opposition rather than resolve underlying grievances.

The expansion of BRICS to 11 members, including South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia, provides an umbrella under which China and Russia can coordinate economic and security partnerships to counter Western dominance. Many African governments are pursuing hedging strategies, using competing offers to play rivals off against each other—a high-wire act that can yield better terms but also multiplies the risk of entrapment in someone else’s great-power contest.

Frequently Asked Questions

What exactly are resource-for-security deals?

Resource-for-security deals are agreements in which African governments grant foreign states or their proxies privileged access to critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium, gold or uranium in return for military assistance, security guarantees or regime protection. They extend the older resources-for-infrastructure model into the security domain, with protection from rebels, jihadist groups or political rivals becoming the service purchased with mineral wealth.

Which countries are most involved in these arrangements?

The Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, the Central African Republic, Niger and Burkina Faso are the most prominent cases. Russia operates through the Africa Corps in several of these states, while the United States has formalised its approach through the December 2025 Washington Accord with the DRC and has reportedly proposed a similar deal to the Alliance of Sahel States. China remains the largest overall player through its infrastructure-for-resources model, though it frames its engagement less explicitly in security terms.

What are the main risks of resource-for-security deals for African countries?

Analysts identify several interconnected risks: erosion of resource sovereignty, reinforcement of authoritarian governance patterns, marginalisation of local communities, and the creation of incentives to prolong conflict rather than resolve it. When private military contractors are paid in concessions, security becomes tied to continued extraction, and the resulting dependencies can constrain democratic participation and policy autonomy for years.